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Comments
PROOF AND EFFECT OF MISTAKE AS TO THE
PROVISIONS OF WILLS
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this comment is to identify the types of mistakes in
wills and to discuss generally the effect of each type. Primary attention
will be given to the Missouri decisions. These types of mistakes are charac-
terized as (1) mistakes in the inducement, (2) mistakes in the expression,
(3) mistakes as to the legal effect, and (4) mistakes as to the instrument.
With respect to each of these types, the discussion will focus on whether
the courts will afford relief to the parties injured by the mistake. The
initial question is whether extrinsic evidence is necessary to disclose the
error and the testator's intent but for the error. If extrinsic evidence is
required, the determinative issue is commonly whether the court will admit
such evidence. The standards for the admission of such evidence will be
treated in detail.
II. MIsTAKFS IN THE INDUCEMENT
A mistake in the inducement relates "to facts outside the instrument
itself"' and affects the formulation of the testator's intent concerning the
disposition of his property. 2 Although the testator intends to execute the
instrument that he does, he would not execute it with full knowledge of
the facts. He is not mistaken about the instrument or its contents: both
are as he intends them. Rather, the testator's mistake as to a matter extrinsic
to the document induces him to select the dispositive plan contained there-
in.3 For example, the testator may erroneously believe that his brother,
his sole heir, has schemed against him. This is a mistake in the induce-
ment if the testator is thereby induced to execute a will leaving his
entire estate to a friend.
A. Tile General Rule
A party adversely affected by a mistake in the inducement might seek
to have the relevant dispositive provision invalidated, causing the property
purportedly disposed of by that provision to pass by the residuary clause
or by intestacy. Under the Statute of Wills, 4 however, a court would
normally refuse to invalidate the provision, because the testator duly
executed the will with the intent that it dispose of his estate.5 Professor
1. T. ATKINSON, WILLS § 59, at 278 (2d ed. 1953).
2. Henderson, Mistake and Fraud in Wills, 47 B.U.L. REv. 303, 318 (1967).
3. 1 W. PAGE, WILLS § 13.11, at 681 (Bowe-Parker rev. ed. 1960).
4. Statute of Wills, 32 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1540). This statute was superseded in
England by the Wills Act, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c 26, § IX (1837), and in Missouri
by §§ 474.310-.330, RSMo 1969.
5. Henderson, supra note 2, at 321. Reformation is normally not available
to correct mistakes in the inducement. See pt. iii, § A of this comment.
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Atkinson's black letter law on the subject is that "[i]n absence of statute,
relief will not be given for mistake in the inducement of the will . .. ."
One commentator has interpreted the Missouri case of Wood v. Car-
penter7 as standing for this general rule.8 In that case the testator stated
in his will that the bequest to his daughter, together with certain advance-
ments, made her total share equal to the shares of the other children. The
bequest actually left the daughter with a smaller share. The Missouri
Supreme Court said that the will was valid, even though the testator
apparently based the bequest to his daughter on an erroneous calculation.
Similarly, the court in In re Garrison's Estate9 denied relief where the
testator bequeathed to his daughter only one dollar, under the mistaken
belief that she was to receive 80 acres of land under the will of the testator's
father.
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions follow the general rule.
For example, courts have denied relief for the following mistakes in the
inducement: The testator's mistaken belief that the beneficiary was his
lawful spouse; 0 the testator's mistake as to the property that his relatives
owned;"' the testator's mistake as to the value of his property;' 2 and the
testator's mistaken belief that a material object of his bounty was livingl a
or dead.' 4
The primary justification for denying relief is to maintain the integrity
of the will as a written instrument against attack based upon extrinsic,
and often oral, evidence. i5 Also, reliable proof of the mistake is difficult
to obtain: the mistake is wholly subjective in nature, yet the subject is
never available to testify.16 Finally, inquiry into what the testator would
have done had he not been mistaken is too conjectural to be undertaken,
on the basis of extrinsic evidence. 17 In Elam v. Phariss'8 the Missouri
Supreme Court used the following public policy argument to justify denial
of relief for mistake in the inducement:
It is against sound public policy to permit a pure mistake to
defeat the duly solemnized and completely competent testa-
mentary act. It is more important that the probate of the wills
of dead people be effectively shielded from the attacks of a
6. T. ATmrNsoN, supra note 1, § 59, at 278.
7. 166 Mo. 465, 66 S.W. 172 (1902).
8. 1 W. PAGE, supra note 3, § 13.11.
9. 374 S.W.2d 92 (Mo. 1964).
10. Meluish v. Milton, L.R. 3 Ch. D. 27 (1876).
11. Riley v. Casey, 185 Iowa 461, 170 N.W. 742 (1919).
12. Barker v. Comins, 110 Mass. 477 (1872); In re Jones' Will, 85 N.Y.S. 294
(Sur. Ct. 1890).
13. In re Woods, 189 App. Div. 324, 178 N.Y.S. 573 (1919).
14. Estate of Holmes, 98 Colo. 360, 56 P.2d 1333 (1936); In re Tousey's
Will, 34 Misc. 363, 69 N.Y.S. 846 (Sur. Ct. 1901); Bowerman v. Burris, 138 Tenn.
220, 197 S.W. 490 (1917).
15. Warren, Fraud, Undue Influence, and Mistake in Wills, 41 HAxv. L. Ruv.
309, 329-30 (1928).
16. Henderson, supra note 2, at 322.
17. Id. at 323.
18. 289 Mo. 209, 232 S.W. 693 (1921).
1973]
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multitude of fictitious mistakes than that it be purged of wills
containing a few real ones.19
B. Exceptions to the General Rule
1. The Common Law Exception
The courts have created a narrow exception to the general rule. Relief
may be granted if both the mistaken belief and its effect upon disposition
appear on the face of the instrument.20 In Gifford v. Dyer,21 the testatrix
mistakenly thought her son was dead and, therefore, did not mention him
in her will. Refusing to give any relief for the mistake, the court upheld
probate of the will against the son's attack. In dictum, however, the court
originated the above-stated exception. In support of the exception, the
court cited Campbell v. French, 2 2 an English case involving the doctrine
of dependent relative revocation, as standing for the following proposi-
tion: "[W]hen the testator revokes a legacy, upon the mistaken supposition
that the legatee is dead, and this [supposition] appears on the face of the
instrument of revocation, such revocation was held void." 23
Although the suggested exception seems just and sound, those seeking
relief for mistake in the inducement are seldom able to meet its require-
19. Id. at 218, 232 S.W. at 695.
20. In re Tousey's Will, 34 Misc. 363, 69 N.Y.S. 846 (Sur. Ct. 1901); Gifford
v. Dyer, 2 R.I. 99 (1852); Bowerman v. Burris, 138 Tenn. 220, 197 S.W. 490(1917).
21. 2 R.I. 99 (1852). Under some pretermitted heir statutes the result would
be different. See pt. II, § B of this comment.
22. 3 Vesey, Jr. 321, 30 Eng. Rep. 1033 (Ch. 1797).
23. 2 R.I. at 102. Where the testator revokes his will by burning, tearing,
cancelling, or obliterating, as distinguished from a later testamentary instrument,
while operating under a mistake of law or fact, the courts usually invoke the
doctrine of dependent relative revocation by declaring that the revocatory intent
manifested is conditioned upon the existence of the situation as believed by the
testator and that the will is not revoked because the condition was not fulfilled.
T. ATKINSON, supra note 1, § 88, at 452. The dictum in Gifford v. Dyer refers to
revocation by subsequent testamentary instrument. When an express clause of
revocation in a subsequent testamentary instrument is induced by mistake, the
doctrine of dependent relative revocation is not usually applied, unless both
the mistake and what the testator would have done if he had known the true
situation appear from the face of the revocatory instrument. Board of County
Comm'rs v. Scott, 88 Minn. 386, 93 N.W. 109 (1903); Tupper v. Tupper, 1 K. &
J. 665, 69 Eng. Rep. 627 (Ch. 1855). Where a subsequent testamentary instru-
ment does not contain an express clause of revocation but makes dispositions
inconsistent with the will which are ineffective, there is modem English authority
for carrying out the original will. Ward v. Van de Loeff [1924] A.C. 653. Most
American decisions, however, follow the rule in French's Case, 1 Roll. Abr. 614(0) 4 (1587), that mistake as to the validity of inconsistent dispositions of property
by a later testamentary instrument does not prevent those dispositions from
revoking the will, unless what the testator would have done if he had known
the truth is apparent from the face of the later testamentary instrument con-
taining the invalid dispositions. Hairston v. Hairston, 30 Miss. 276 (1855); Mort
v. Trustees of Baker Univ., 229 Mo. App. 632, 78 S.W.2d 498 (K.C. Ct. App.
1935); cf. Ewell v. Sneed, 136 Tenn. 602, 191 S.W. 131 (1917). This being so,
the rules in this country respecting the effect of mistake in the inducement of
revocation by subsequent testamentary instrument are virtually identical with
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ments. One of the rare cases in which the court granted relief is Penick's
Executor v. Walker.24 In that case, the testator bequeathed to his daughter
$10,000 in trust and provided that "[t]his sum can be made up of money
from my insurance policies." 25 Upon the testator's death, the daughter
received the policy proceeds of about $10,000 as beneficiary of the policies.
The court held the bequest invalid, because the testator, apparently, had
mistakenly believed that the policy proceeds would be part of his estate
and had intended that his daughter receive a total of only $10,000.
2. Statutory Exceptions
The Missouri pretermitted child statute26 creates an exception to
the general rule. This statute affords relief for a testator's unintentional
failure to provide for a child whom the testator believes dead when he
executes the will, by giving such child an intestate share.
The Georgia statute is much broader. Section 113-210 of the Georgia
Code provides that a testator's mistake of fact concerning the existence
or conduct of an heir invalidates the will with regard to that heir.27
Allegations of mistaken beliefs that have gone to trial on the merits in-
dude: That the testator's wife planned to murder him;28 that the testatrix's
husband was trying to deprive her of custody of their child;29 that the
testator's wife opposed him on a school bond issue;30 that the caveatrix
had spread false and malicious rumors about the testator;31 that the
testator's wife hated him;32 and that the testatrix's daughter was dead.33
Whether the testator executed the will under a mistake of fact as to the
existence or conduct of an heir is a jury question.34 The testator's declara-
24. 125 Va. 274, 99 S.E. 559 (1919). In Snyder v. Raymond, 48 Idaho 810,
285 P. 478 (1930), there was evidence that the second will was executed under
a mistaken apprehension that the testatrix's existing Indian will disposed only
of allotted land held in trust by the government. The court denied probate
of the second will. See generally T. ATKINSON, supra note 1, § 59, at 278; Annot.,
17 A.L.R. 247 (1922).
25. 125 Va. at 276, 99 S.E. at 559 (1919).
26. § 474.240 (2), RSMo 1969:
If, at the time of the making of his will, the testator believes that any
of his children are dead, and fails to provide for such child in his will,
the child shall receive a share ... equal in value to that which he would
have received if the testator had died intestate, unless it appears from the
will or from other evidence that the testator would not have devised
anything to such child had he known that the child was alive.
See also UNIFORM PROBATE CoDF § 2-302 (pretermitted child statute), § 2-301 (after-
acquired wife statute).
27. GA. CODE § 113-210 (1959): "A will executed under a mistake of fact
as to the existence or conduct of an heir at law of the testator is inoperative,
insofar as such heir at law is concerned, but the testator shall be deemed to have
died intestate as to him." See generally Oliver, Wills-Mistake of Fact as to the
Existence or Conduct of an Heir, 1 GA. S.B.J. 543 (1965).
28. Bohler v. Hicks, 120 Ga. 800, 48 S.E. 306 (1904).
29. Franklin v. Belt, 130 Ga. 37, 60 S.E. 146 (1908).
30. Watkins v. Jones, 189 Ga. 831, 193 S.E. 889 (1937).
31. Davis v. Aultman, 199 Ga. 129, 33 S.E.2d 317 (1945).
82. Moreland v. Word, 209 Ga. 463, 74 S.E.2d 82 (1953).
33. Pennington v. Perry, 156 Ga. 103, 118 S.E. 710 (1923).
34. Knox v. Knox, 213 Ga. 677, 101 S.E.2d 89 (1957).
1973]
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tions are admissible to show his state of mind.3 5 Although the inducement
for the mistake can be from any source,3 6 only an heir at law can invoke
the statute.37
III. MISTAKES IN THE EXPRESSION
A mistake in the expression is an error in the dispositive provisions
of a will that results from a mistaken omission or inclusion, or a combina-
tion of the two.3 8 For example, if the testator intended to bequeath $100
to his brother, Fred, but his will contains no provision to that effect,
the error is one of omission. If the testator did not intend to bequeath
$100 to Fred, but the scrivener mistakenly inserted the bequest, the mistake
is one of inclusion. If the testator's will does not contain an intended
gift of $100 to Fred and instead includes an unintended gift of $100 to
his brother Ferdinand, the will contains two mistakes-omission of the
gift to Fred and inclusion of the gift to Ferdinand. Such combined errors
of omission and inclusion are considered under the category of mis-
description.39
A. Reformation
Ostensibly, the equitable remedy of reformation could be utilized to
correct mistakes in the expression. However, courts of equity regularly
refuse to grant reformation of a will that varies from the testator's actual
wishes; 40 only Tennessee holds to the contrary.41 The courts have given
different reasons for refusing this relief. One such reason is the possibility
of fraud and perjury. As one court stated:
To allow the reformation of a will in favor of disappointed
devisees or contesting heirs and upon such evidence as they might
produce after the death of the testator, would open the door for
fraud and perjury to substitute designs of interested beneficiaries
for the deliberately expressed intent of a testator.42
Another reason is that statute requires a will to be in writing; hence, the
courts have no power to substitute different words for the written words
of the testator.43
Neither of these reasons seems valid, however. The chance for fraud
and perjury is just as great when a party to a contract seeks reformation,
and the other contracting party is dead; yet, reformation may be granted.
Moreover, equity will reform contracts and deeds, even though the Statute
35. Lee v. Boyer, 217 Ga. 27, 120 S.E.2d 757 (1961).
26. Adams v. Cooper, 148 Ga. 339, 96 S.E. 858 (1918).
37. Hixon v. West, 83 Ga. 786, 10 S.E. 450 (1889).
38. T. ATKINSON, supra note 1, § 58, at 274.
39. Id.; see pt. III, § D of this comment.
40. See Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick, 36 Iowa 674 (1873); Hoover v. Roberts,
144 Kan. 58, 58 P.2d 83 (1936); Mudd v. Cunningham, 181 S.W. 386 (Mo. 1915);
Goode v. Goode, 22 Mo. 518 (1856).
41. See Greer v. Anderson, 36 Tenn. App. 507, 259 S.W.2d 550 (1953);
Eatherly v. Eatherly, 41 Tenn. 461, 78 Am. Dec. 495 (1860). In Greer the court
stated that equity has the power to reform a will by supplying an omission where
the omission is apparent upon the face of the will.
42. Polsey v. Newton, 199 Mass. 450, 454, 85 N.E. 574, 575 (1908).
43. Decker v. Decker, 121 Ill. 341, 12 N.E. 750 (1887).
[Vol. 38
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of Frauds requires that they be proved by a writing. The same could be
done in the case of wills. 44
As yet, the courts have not accepted these arguments. One reason is
that in many cases the courts may accomplish reformation under the guise
of construction. 45 In Stuesse v. Stuesse46 the Missouri Supreme Court frank-
ly acknowledged this:
The question of correcting a draftsman's mistake is largely one
of semantics, because although the generally accepted view is that
a will cannot be reformed, the same result is accomplished under
the name of "construction," and when a court construes a will as
passing property not mentioned . . . or substitutes for mis-
described property... other property not described ... it is in
effect "reforming" the will.4 7
B. Mistakes of Omission
The statutes governing execution of wills give rise to a restriction
on the power of courts to add mistakenly omitted provisions to a will.
Until 1858 in England, wills devising real property and testaments be-
queathing personal property were handled by separate courts. 48 The com-
mon law courts from the first refused to add words to devises of realty,
which were governed by the Statute of Wills of 1540. 49 The Statute of
Frauds of 1677 permitted oral testaments of personal property. 50 Before
1837 the ecclesiastical courts, which had exclusive jurisdiction over probate
of testaments of personal property, could include clauses omitted by
mistake from a written testament. 51 After 1837, however, when the statutes
required the same formalities of execution for wills of real estate and
personal property,52 the ecclesiastical courts and the secular Court of
Probate which succeeded to their jurisdiction in 1858 refused to add
words to a will of personal property, despite dear evidence of the testator's
intention.53 Hence, the modem English rule is that words omitted by
44. 1 W. PAGE, supra note 3, § 13.8, at 679.
45. Annot., 90 A.L.R.2d 924, 928 (1963) states: "What the courts undoubt-
edly mean by holding that a will cannot be reformed is that a suit for reformation
is not the appropriate remedy, but that the appropriate remedy is a suit for
construction."
46. 377 S.W.2d 389 (Mo. 1964).
47. Id. at 391-2, citing Annot., 90 A.L.R.2d 924, 928 (1963).
48. 1 W. PAGE, supra note 3, § 13.7, at 672.
49. Anonymous, Hill 29 Eliz. 149, 78 Eng. Rep. 80 (C.P. 1587). This case
was decided under the English Statute of Wills, 32 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1540) explained
by 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 5 (1542-43), which gave to persons holding by socage
tenure power to devise the whole of their lands and to persons holding by
knight service the power to devise two-thirds of their lands.
50. See Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 19, (1676). See generally Atkin-
son, Brief History of English Testamentary Jurisdiction, 8 Mo. L. REv. 107 (1943).
51. Castell v. Tagg, 1 Curt. Ecc. 298, 163 Eng. Rep. 102 (Prerogative Ct.
Canterbury 1836). While the ecclesiastical courts had exclusive jurisdiction to
determine what words should be admitted to probate, the High Court of Chancery
by construction would determine what they meant. However, in 1971 the
Chancery Division acquired both types of jurisdiction. See Administration of
Justice Act of 1970, c. 31.
52. Wills Act, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c. 26 (1837).
53. Mitchell v. Gard, 3 S.W. & T.R. 75, 164 Eng. Rep. 1200 (P. 1862).
1973]
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mistake from wills of real or personal property may not be added.54 For
example, in In re Horrocks,55 the Probate Divorce and Admiralty Division,
which had succeeded to the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, refused
to add the word "and," which had been omitted because of a typographical
error, even though without the word, the gift was void for uncertainty.
American courts also refuse to add words or limitations, because under
the typical statutes, the courts can admit nothing to probate that is not
in the instrument.56 Thus, in cases of mistake by omission, extrinsic evi-
dence of the testator's intention is inadmissible to show what property
he meant to dispose of or the beneficiary to whom he meant it to pass.5 7
Likewise, there is no authority for the imposition of a constructive trust
in the case of mistake by omission. 58
Relief through construction may be available for mistakes of omis-
sion in two situations. Generally, these are situations where the court
needs only to look to the instrument to find the error and the testator's
intention. First, when an express reference to a missing portion of the
will dearly indicates that the testator intended to include language making
a certain disposition of property, the courts will often infer an intent
to make the omitted disposition.60 The factors determining whether relief
will be granted are the nature of the mistake, the finding of intent to
make a disposition in the instrument, and the particularity with which
the details of the disposition are shown in the will. 00
Second, even where no express reference is made to the mistakenly
omitted provision, the courts will often grant relief where the terms of a
missing provision are clear from the context and the omission of the
provision appears to have been the product of a mistake in the expres-
sion.61 Shea v. Lyons62 provides an example of this approach. In that case,
the testator devised his farm to his widow, Catherine, for her life, and
upon her death to his son, Earl, for his life, and provided that in the
54. 1 W. PAGE, WiLLs § 13.7, at 673 (Bowe-Parker rev. ed. 1960).
55. [1939] P. 198.
56. See Estate of De Moulin, 101 Cal. App. 2d 221, 225 P.2d 303 (1950)(failure to name or describe beneficiary of residue); In re Estate of Wirsig, 128
Neb. 297, 258 N.W. 467 (1935) (failure to name or describe beneficiary in first
clause of will). In both cases extrinsic evidence was held inadmissable. But see
Baker v. Grossglauser, 250 S.W. 377 (Mo. 1923), discussed in text accompanying
footnote 77 infra.
57. Cassilly v. Devenny, 168 Md. 443, 177 A. 919 (1935); McCoy v. Brad-
bury, 290 Mo. 650, 235 S.W. 1047 (1921); In re Estate of Wirsig, 128 Neb. 297,
258 N.W. 467 (1935). See generally 4 W. PAGE, supra note 54, § 32.9, at 266. But
see text accompanying note 92 infra.
58. Gray, Striking Words Out of a Will, 26 HARv. L. REv. 212, 214 (1913).
59. Connor v. Gardner, 230 Ill. 258, 82 N.E. 640 (1907). Although there
was no devise of real estate to testator's children, the court found an intention
to devise "manifest from the general testamentary scheme as gathered from the
words of the will." See generally Henderson, Mistake and Fraud in Wills, 47 B.U.L.
REv. 303, 367 (1967).
60. Henderson, supra note 59, at 368.
61. Estate of Karkeet, 56 Cal. 2d 277, 863 P.2d 896, 14 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1961);
Spathariotis v. Estate of Spathas, 156 Colo. 131, 398 P.2d 39 (1964); Shea v.
Lyons, 47 111. App. 2d 187, 198 N.E.2d 151 (1964). See generally Henderson,
supra note 59, at 368.
62. 47 Ill. App. 2d 187, 198 N.E.2d 151 (1964).
[V'ol. 38
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event neither Earl nor Earl's children survived Catherine, the farm should
go to the testator's sisters and the descendants of any deceased sisters. From
this, the court inferred that the testator's intent was that in the event Earl
survived Catherine and died without children, the remainder should go,
upon his death, to the testator's sisters and the descendants of any deceased
sisters.
The Missouri case of Baker v. Grossglauser63 implies that Missouri
courts will follow the relatively modern trend that these cases reflect. In
Baker, a partition suit, it was contended that a provision that at the life
tenant's death, "I give devise and bequeath to her three children from
her first husband to be equal parts," 4 was insufficient to pass realty in
fee simple. Rejecting this contention, the supreme court noted that it was
presumed that the testator intended to dispose of the remainder, rather
than die intestate as to that portion of his estate. As a result, it concluded
that through a probable error of the scrivener the words "my estate,"
or words of similar import, were omitted after the word "bequeath" in the
quoted clause and that they should be inferred.
C. Mistakes of Inclusion
Courts are more willing to grant relief for mistakes of inclusion than
for mistakes of omission. If the mistake is only to part of the contents of
the will, as where one bequest is included by mistake, the courts usually
will apply the doctrine of partial invalidity65 and reject only the mistakenly
included provision. However, some doubt exists whether this doctrine
applies in Missouri. 66 If the mistake is to the entire contents or to an
important provision, however, the entire will must be denied probate.8 7
The difficult problem in obtaining relief for mistakes of inclusion
is establishing that the contents are not as the testator intended them.
63. 250 S.W. 377 (Mo. 1923); see Buschmeyer v. Eikermann, 378 S.W.2d 46
(Mo. 1964); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Sowell, 359 S.W.2d 719 (Mo. 1962); Ussher
v. Mercantile Trust Co., 328 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. 1959).
64. 250 S.W. at 378.
65. The doctrine of partial invalidity allows the court to probate a will
minus a single provision that was included by mistake. T. ATKINSON, WILTS §
61 (2d ed. 1953).
66. The possibility that a court will invalidate the entire will upon finding
mistake as to one provision arises from the Missouri case of McCarthy v. Fidelity
Nat'l Bank &c Trust Co., 325 Mo. 727, 30 S.W.2d 19 (1930), which construed
section 525, RSMo 1919 (now section 473.083, RSMo 1969). The court said that
under this statute, issue must be joined as to whether a writing is the will of the
testator in its entirety, and that the issue in a will contest for fraud or undue
influence is whether there is a will or no will. Thus, a mistake in one provision
of a will might invalidate the entire will. The following language from Hines v.
Hines, 243 Mo. 480, 147 S.W. 774 (1912), reinforces this reasoning: "When a
will is contested, the contest acts upon the interests of every party concerned
therein, and, if it is adjudged to be no will as to the plaintiff, then it cannot
be valid as to any one named in the will as devisee or legatee." Id. at 496, 147
S.W. at 776.
67. Bradford v. Blossom, 207 Mo. 177, 105 S.W. 289 (1907). The testatrix
wished to give a life estate to her children with remainder over to their children,
but instead the will created an elaborate spendthrift trust giving discretion to
the trustee as to the amount to pay over. The will was denied probate. See gen-
erally 1 W. PAGE, supra note 54, § 13.4, at 665-66.
1973]
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This problem is the result of the rule laid down in the English case of
Guardhouse v. Blackburn. 8 The rule states that
the fact that the will has been duly read over to a capable testator
on the occasion of its execution, or that its contents have been
brought to his notice in any other way, should, when coupled with
his execution thereof, be conclusive evidence that he approved as
well as knew the contents thereof.69
For a time, the courts inaccurately interpreted this statement as a rule of
law, sometimes speaking of it as a conclusive presumption.7 0 In Idle v.
Moody,71 the Missouri Supreme Court considered the rule. The testatrix
intended to make only a specific gift in a codicil, but by mistake the
scrivener also inserted a general residuary clause. The testatrix had an
opportunity to have it read to her. In holding the codicil valid, the court
seemed to accept the Guardhouse presumption.
Both English and American courts have retreated from the Guard-
house rule. These courts now view such evidence as giving rise only to a
rebuttable presumption that the testator approved the contents. Thus,
instead of an insurmountable conclusive presumption, the rule poses a
problem of proof and evidence. 72
Although American courts will strike out an entire provision of a
will, they have not gone as far as the English cases, which deny probate
to a single word or part of a provision. 73 For example, in Morrell v.
Morrell,74 the testator directed his solicitor to give all his shares in a com-
pany to a legatee, but the solicitor by mistake inserted "forty" before
"shares." The probate court struck the word "forty" from the will in
four places, so that the legatee took all the shares as the testator intended.
Without explicitly recognizing the English method of striking out
a word or phrase, the American courts often reach the same result by
nullifying the effect of the word or phrase via construction.7 5 Wherever
possible in light of the surrounding circumstances, a court will cure a mis-
take in expression by construction of the terms of the will. 70 The Missouri
Supreme Court in Paris v. Erisman77 transposed words in the will so as
to reflect the testator's intent. This case indicates that the court might
68. L. R. I P. & D. 109 (1866).
69. id. at 116 (emphasis added).
70. T. ATKINSON, supra note 65, § 58, at 275.
71. 344 Mo. 594, 127 S.W.2d 660 (1939).
72. 1 W. PAGE, supra note 54 § 13.4, at 666; Warren, Fraud, Undue Influence
and Mistake in Wills, 41 HARv. L. Rxv. 309, 324 (1928).
73. T. ATKINSON, supra note 65, § 158, at 277; 1 W. PAGE, supra note 56, §
13.7, at 675.
74. 7 P.D. 68 (1882).
75. T. ATKINSON, supra note 65, § 58, at 277; G. THOMPSON, WILLS § 137,
at 216 (3d ed. 1947).
76. 1 W. PAGE, supra note 54, § 13.9, at 679.
77. 300 S.W. 487 (1927). The will devised 80 acres to the testator's wife. The
testator conveyed 3 of the 80 acres to a son and asked the scrivener to prepare
a codicil to reflect this sale. The codicil, as executed, purported to revoke the
devise of the 80 acres, "having sold the same to my son." The court construed
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also use construction to nullify the effect of a word and effecuate the
testator's intention.
In Wiechert v. Wiechert,78 the Missouri Supreme Court accomplished
by construction the striking out of a word or phrase. The will purported
to devise "5 acres, more or less, off the north side of the south half of
the north west quarter" of a certain section, township, and range. The
testator did not own the five acres described, but owned another five-acre
tract that adjoined his home place and was otherwise undisposed of by
the will. In holding that the will disposed of the five-acre tract adjacent
to testator's home place, the court rejected the erroneous description "south
half of the northwest quarter" in accordance with the ancient principle
of falsa demonstratio non nocet,79 whereby a false part of the description
can be rejected if the true part describes the subject or object with reason-
able certainty.8 0
D. Misdescription
Misdescription involves both the omission of an intended designation
and the inclusion of an unintended designation. Such mistakes occur in
two different ways. First, although the testator had in mind the proper
designation, through a clerical error the description does not appear in
the instrument as he intended. Second, although the testator intended
that the will should read as it did, he was in error as to the proper designa-
tion of the property or the beneficiary. In both cases, the will is usually
admitted to probate, and the question is one of construction.8 1
In most cases of misdescription resulting from clerical error, con-
struction renders the mistake inoperative. Such misdescription creates a
latent ambiguity; therefore, extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent is
admissible to resolve the ambiguity.82 The court construes the will as
passing the property actually intended to the beneficiary actually in-
tended.8 3
Missouri courts follow the above approach in cases of misdescription
of real estate.8 4 For example, in Creasy v. Alverson,8 5 the will purported
to devise a portion of the northeast quarter of section 33, township
60, range 6, located in Marion County. The testator did not own that
78. 317 Mo. 118, 294 S.W. 721 (1927).
79. "Mere false description does not vitiate, if there be sufficient certainty
as to the object." H. BROOM, LEGAL MAXITMS 426 (10th ed. 1939).
80. See Patch v. White, 117 U.S. 210 (1886) (leading case); text accompany-
ing notes 82-86 infra.
81. T. ATKINSON, supra note 65, § 60, at 282.
82. Annot., 90 A.L.R.2d 924, 952 (1963). The Missouri decisions make no
distinction between patent and latent ambiguity. Latent ambiguity is said to
exist whenever a description meant to apply to a single person or object turns
out, upon the examination of surrounding facts, either to apply equally to two
or more persons or objects or, in the alternative, to apply to no person or object
whatever. An ambiguity is patent whenever it appears on the face of the instru-
ment without the necessity of examining surrounding circumstances.
83. Id.
84. See Myher v. Myher, 224 Mo. 631, 123 S.W. 806 (1909); Thomson v. Thom-
son, 115 Mo. 56, 21 S.W. 1085 (1893); Riggs v. Myers, 20 Mo. 239 (1855);
Annot., 94 A.L.R. 26, 131 (1935).
85. 43 Mo. 13 (1868).
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land, which actually was located in another county, but he did own a
corresponding portion of the northeast quarter of section 33 in township 59,
range 6, in Marion County. By construction, the court avoided the error of
the draftsman in inserting the wrong numbers. Similarly, in Mudd v. Cun-
ningham,S" the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's admission
of extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity caused by the scrivener's
mistaken insertion of "northeast" instead of "northwest" in a devise to
the testator's wife and daughter.
Missouri courts follow the same approach where a clerical error
results in misdescription of a beneficiary.8 7 In Willard v. Darrah88 the
testator made a devise to "my well beloved nephews, John and William
Willard." Although the testator was survived by two grandnephews named
John and William Willard and two grandsons named John and William
Willard, he had no nephews bearing those names. The court admitted
extrinsic evidence that the grandsons were intimate with testator, that
the grandnephews were strangers to him and that the scrivener had mis-
takenly written "nephews" instead of "grandchildren." In Bond v. Riley8
the court found latent ambiguity and allowed extrinsic evidence to show
that testator wanted his grandson to take under the will and that the
scrivener understood the grandson's name-actually Boyd Bond-to be
William Newton Bond.
The second type of misdescription arises when the testator intended
that the will should read as it did, but was mistaken as the proper designa-
tion of the property or beneficiary. As in cases of clerical error, Missouri
courts admit extrinsic evidence to resolve ambiguities and correct inac-
curacies that the misdescription creates. In Stuesse v. Stuesse,110 a will
devised certain sections of realty upon an improper land survey. The court
held that where there is an inaccurate description of real property or
where there is a latent ambiguity with respect thereto, extrinsic evidence
is competent to resolve the ambiguity and identify the property designated.
In American Cancer Society, Inc. v. Damon Runyon Memorial Fund for
Cancer Research, Inc.,91 this rule was applied to a bequest to a non-
existent charity. The testatrix made a bequest "to the Damon Runyon
Memorial Fund for Cancer Research, St. Joseph, Missouri Chapter." Al-
though the Damon Runyon Fund had no St. Joseph Chapter, there was
a Buchanan County [St. Joseph] Chapter of the American Cancer Society,
Missouri Division, that she might have confused. The court admitted
extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity, but held that the bequest,
lapsed, because, apparently, the testator intended to benefit neither the
Damon Runyon Fund nor the American Cancer Society.
86. 181 S.W. 886 (Mo. 1915).
87. See Bishop v. Broyles, 324 Mo. 69, 22 S.W.2d 790 (1929); Gordon v.
Burris, 141 Mo. 602, 43 S.W. 642 (1897); Hockensmith v. Slusher, 26 Mo. 237
(1858); Riggs v. Myers, 20 Mo. 239 (1858) (dictum); In re Aiken, 5 S.W.2d 662
(St. L. Mo. App. 1928); see Annots., 90 A.L.R.2d 924, 955 (1963), 94 A.L.R. 26,
79 (1935).
88. 168 Mo. 660, 68 S.VMT. 1023 (1902).
89. 317 Mo. 594, 296 S.W. 401 (1927).
90. 377 S.W.2d 389 (1964), discussed in Fratcher, Trusts and Succession in
Missouri, 30 Mo. L. REv. 82, 92-93 (1965).
91. 409 S.W.2d 222 (1966).
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Although Missouri courts allow the use of extrinsic evidence to clear
up nearly any ambiguity, they limit the admissibility of the testator's
statements. His statements are only admissible where the will's descrip-
tion fits two persons equally, or where it is partially correct and partially
incorrect and the correct part is equivocal.92 In Willard v. Darrah,93
where the testator's designation of beneficiaries applied equally to his
grandnephews named John and William Willard and to his grandsons
named John and William Willard, the court allowed evidence of the
testator's declarations of intention to benefit his grandsons. In Bond v.
Riley,94 where the devise was to the testator's grandson, "William N.
Bond," and there was no such person, the court admitted the testator's
declarations that "he wanted his grandson," Boyd C. Bond, to take.95
IV. MIsTAxEs AS TO THE LEGAL EFFECr
When the testator merely misconceives the legal effect of the language
used in the will, the majority of courts refuse to invalidate the will or
any part thereof. 06 This is true even if incorrect legal advice caused the
misconception97 The rationale is that if one could contest a will on the
ground that the testator had imperfect knowledge of the legal consequences
of the provisions of his will and a jury could concern itself with the
subjective subtleties involved in determining the testator's conception of
the law, "half the wills in the country" might be upset.98
In Buck v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.,99 the Missouri Supreme Court
reiterated the general rule: "[While a testator] should have a reasonable
understanding as to how he desires his will to take effect, it is not neces-
sary that he should have that knowledge of its scope and bearing possessed
by his legal adviser."100 Elant v. Phariss'0 ' involved a contest of a testatrix's
will devising land to her husband for life and providing that he should
appropriate from the income a certain sum annually to purchase a home
for testatrix's daughter when a specified amount was aggregated. The
bequest to the daughter could not be charged to the husband's life estate,
because the husband was entitled by curtesy to a life estate in the realty
of his wife. Because the testatrix apparently knew what the will con-
92. Bond v. Riley, 317 Mo. 594, 608, 296 S.W. 401, 407 (1927).
93. 168 Mo. 660, 68 S.W. 1023 (1902).
94. 317 Mo. 594, 296 S.W. 401 (1927); see McCoy v. Bradbury, 290 Mo.
650, 235 S.W. 1047 (1921).
95. Both of these Missouri decisions followed the precedent of the famous
English case, Doe d. Gord v. Needs, 150 Eng. Rep. 698 (1836). The will con-
tained a legacy to a "George Gord, the son of John Gord," and another to
"George Gord, the son of George Gord," and also a devise to "George Gord, the
son of Cord." It was held that it was permissible to show testator's declaration as
to which George was the intended beneficiary of the devise.
96. Elam v. Phariss, 289 Mo. 209, 232 S.W. 693 (1921); Buck v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co., 267 Mo. 644, 185 S.W. 208 (1916); Estate of Beech, [19233 P.
46; T. ATKINSON, supra note 65, § 58, at 277.
97. Elam v. Phariss, 289 Mo. 209, 232 S.W. 693 (1921).
98. In re Cotter, 180 Misc. 399, 40 N.Y.S.2d 93 (Sur. Ct. 1943).
99. 267 Mo. 644, 185 S.V. 208 (1916).
100. Id. at 649, 185 S.W. at 209; accord, Kischman v. Scott, 166 Mo. 214, 65
S.W. 1031 (1901); Couch v. Gentry, 113 Mo. 248, 20 S.W. 890 (1892).
101. 289 Mo. 209, 232 S.W. 693 (1921).
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tained, the court refused to invalidate the will, even though the attorney
who drafted the will had erroneously advised the testatrix that such a
bequest was valid. Thus, this case not only reinforces the general rule,
but applies it to errors caused by incorrect legal advice as well.
A few cases hold to the contrary.1 02 Moreover, even Missouri courts
hold that failure of the words in the will to effectuate the intent com-
municated by the testator to the draftsman invalidates the will where
the testator executed the will without knowing what words were in it.103
In Bradford v. Blossom, 0 4 the testatrix instructed her confidential adviser
to have her will drawn so as to give a beneficial life interest to her chil-
dren and the remainder in fee to their children. The adviser's lawyer
drafted an instrument setting up an elaborate spendthrift trust with the
children as beneficiaries and with the trustee having discretion over the
amount of the principal to be given to the grandchildren after the deaths
of their parents. The testatrix signed the instrument, believing that it
provided as she had directed. There was no evidence that the instrument
was read or explained to the testatrix, nor that she had read it or had
any knowledge of its contents. Therefore, the court held that the instru-
ment was not the testatrix's will. Similarly, in Cowan v. Shaver 05 the
draftsman inserted language that would not have effectuated the testator's
intent. Without knowing the language contained in the instrument, the
testator signed it, under the belief that it was written as he directed. The
Missouri Supreme Court held that the instrument was not the testator's
will.
V. MISTAKES AS TO THE INSTRUMENT
Mistake as to the instrument occurs when the testator intends to
execute his will but by mistake signs the wrong document. This usually
occurs when two persons intend to execute mutual wills, but in a common
execution ceremony, each executes the other's will by mistake.100 English
courts,10 7 American courts,108 and commentators' 0 agree that "[p]robate
will be denied when the testator through mistake executed the wrong
102. See, e.g., In re Kempthorne, 188 Iowa 70, 175 N.W. 857 (1920). In that
case the scrivener did not understand that the testator's daughter was divorced,
and included a clause that operated for her ex-husband's benefit. The court
stated that such circumstances afforded a substantial obstacle to the probate of
the will.
103. See Bradford v. Blossom, 207 Mo. 177, 105 S.W. 289 (1907); Cowan v.
Shaver, 197 Mo. 203, 95 S.W. 200 (1906). See also 1 W. PAGE, supra note 54, § 13.6,
at 672.
104. 207 Mo. 177, 105 S.W. 289 (1907).
105. 197 Mo. 203, 95 S.W. 200 (1906).
106. See, e.g., Nelson v. McDonald, 61 Hun. 406, 61 N.Y.S. 273 (Sup. Ct.
1891); In re Bacon, 165 Misc. 259, 300 N.Y.S. 920 (Sur. Ct. 1937); Alter's Appeal,
67 Pa. 341, 5 Am. Rep. 433 (1871).
107. In re Meyer, [1908) P. 353; Goods of Hunt, L.R. 3 P. 9- D. 250 (1875).
108. Sansona v. Laria, 88 Conn. 136, 90 A. 28 (1914); Waite v. Frisbie, 45
Minn. 361, 47 N.W. 1069 (1891); Nelson v. McDonald, 61 Hun. 406, 16 N.Y.S.
273 (Sup. Ct. 1891); Baker v. Baker, 102 Wis. 226, 78 N.W. 453 (1899).
109. T. ATKINSON, supra note 65, § 58, at 273; 1 W. PAGE, WILLS § 13.3, at
665 (Bowe-Parker rev. ed. 1960).
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document as his will."' 10 Although there is no Missouri case exactly in
point, Bradford v. Blossom"' arguably stands for the proposition of deny-
ing probate to a mistakenly executed instrument. 12 In that case, the
testatrix instructed her adviser to have her will drawn with certain disposi-
tions of her property. Without her knowledge, the adviser's lawyer drafted
an instrument providing for entirely different dispositions. The testatrix
executed the instrument without reading it or having it explained to her.
The court held that the instrument was not the testatrix's will.
The rationale for denying probate to both the document mistakenly
signed and the intended will is that the requisite testamentary intent is
satisfied by nothing less than the testator's intent that the instrument he
signed is to govern the disposition of his property at his death." 3
Two British Commonwealth nations take a minority position. n 4 Both
New Zealand and Canadian courts have allowed probate of mutual wills
mistakenly executed by the wrong parties. In Guardian Trust Co. v. In-
wood,"15 two sisters inadvertently signed each other's wills at a common
execution ceremony. The New Zealand court allowed probate of the
unsigned will of one testatrix, stating that she intended that the document
should operate as her will and that to deny probate would be a "very
technical basis for rejection.""16 The Inwood decision has been followed
twice by Canadian courts." 7
The minority approach seems more reasonable than the majority
approach, which frustrates the testator's intent because he misplaced his
signature. The error should be easy to prove. Further, in the case of a
common execution ceremony, the many witnesses to the erroneous execu-
tion would render slight the chance of fraud.
VI. CONCLUSION
Relief will be given for mistake in the inducement only in the rare
case where both the mistake and what the testator would have done but
for the mistake appear on the face of the will or where a remedy is created
by statute.
Mistakes in the expression will not be remedied by reformation except
in one state; however, courts often accomplish the same results via con-
struction. Because of the exclusion of extrinsic evidence, relief is avail-
able for omission only where the courts need but look to the instrument
itself to find the error and what the testator actually intended. When
a provision is mistakenly included, on the other hand, extrinsic evidence
110. T. ATKINSON, supra note 65, § 58, at 273.
111. 207 Mo. 177, 105 S.AN. 289 (1907).
112. 1 W. PAGE, supra note 109, § 13.3, at 665 n.l.
113. 57 Am. JuR. WILLS § 379, at 274 (1948).
114. See In re Duck, Vancouver Registry #51005/53 (B.C. Sup. Ct., April 9,
1953); In re Brander, [1952] 4 D.L.R. 688 (B.C. Sup. Ct.); Guardian Trust Co.
v. Inwood, [1946] N.Z.L.R. 614 (Ct. App.). See generally Kennedy, Wills-Mistake-
Husband and Wife Executing Wills Drawn for Each Other, 31 CAN. B. REv.
444 (1953).
115. [1946] N.Z.L.R. 614 (Ct. App.).
116. Id. at 623.
117. See In re Duck, Vancouver Registry #51005/53 (B.C. Sup. Ct., April
9, 1953); In re Brander, [1952] 4 D.L.R. 688 (B.C. Sup. Ct.).
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is admissible to construe any ambiguities. If the mistake is to the entire
contents or an important provision, the entire will may be denied probate.
But, if the error is the mistaken inclusion of a single provision of a will,
the court will probate the will without the provision. Although American
courts will not deny probate to a single word or part of a provision, they
will often reach the same result via construction. When property or a
beneficiary is misdescribed in the will, extrinsic evidence may be ad-
mitted. Ambiguity must be found in order to allow the admission of
extrinsic evidence to ascertain the testator's intent.
When the testator misconceives the legal effect of the language used
in the will or incorrect legal advice caused his misconception, the majority
of courts will not reject the will or any part thereof. However, Missouri
courts may hold the will invalid where the testator has not read the will.
The majority of courts state that where the testator through mistake
executes the wrong document as his will, probate will be denied. A
preferable minority position has received little recognition.
RANDALL L. FREEDMAN
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